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INVALIDITY OF MARRIAGE
BY REASON OF
SEXUAL ANOMALIES t
CHARLES J. RITTY, J.C.L.*

T

convocation of the Second Vatican Council was an invitation to
an examination of conscience. There has been in the past forty years
or more new thinking in the fields of scripture, liturgy, theology and the
teaching of the Church (catechetics). Canon Law, on the contrary, has
made little revision of jurisprudence in order to keep the law in harmony
with the needs of our times, as evidenced through cases. This presents a
challenge to us in the field of law. It is obvious that there must be new
thinking and research in the studies of Canon Law and the jurisprudence
of the Church. Since the law is a living science, it should fall under the
new dimensions of thought and the circumstances of our times.
The problem of sexual anomalies is becoming more vexing each day
with the number of cases presented to ecclesiastical tribunals. Cultural
patterns have changed and the Victorian attitudes which once suppressed
discussion of sexual anomalies have been submerged by healthier interpretations and understanding of these physical and psychical aberrations
by advances in genetics, psychology, and psychiatry. With the more positive approach to the study of sexual anomalies, e.g., homosexuality,
emerging, we have all noticed an increase in cases which are undoubtedly
presented on the premise that Canon Law has progressed at the same
rate as the behavior sciences.
In treating of the nullity of marriage the tribunals always seek some
norms of jurisprudence to arrive at decisions. As is evident, the judges are
often left without the proper tools to resolve such difficulties. The Code
of Canon Law does not treat of such personality problems, and the jurisprudence of the Rota, which is usually a rule of law and a necessary tool
for jurists, has not given much light on the subject. In fact, at times,
when related subjects such as the sexual anomalies, homosexuality, psychopathic personalities, constitutional immorality, moral degeneracy, etc.,
are presented to the Rota, there has been even a negative attitude.
HE
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It is impossible within the scope of this
paper to discuss all types of moral delinquents, sexual perverts, psychotics, psychopaths, neurotics, sociopaths, etc. We shall
confine our remarks to some thoughts concerning sexual anomalies in general, with
special emphasis on nymphomaniacs and
homosexuals. The recent thinking of psychologists and psychiatrists will help to shed
light upon the subject, together with some
indications of the praxis of the Sacred
Roman Rota.
No one will deny that those afflicted with
sexual anomalies or psychopathic defects
such as we are considering should not enter
marriage. The problem arises because such
persons do enter marriage and then are
unable or unwilling to accept the responsibilities of such a stable union, and eventually abandon their spouses, terminating
the marriage. The question is this: is there
any canonical relief for those who enter
marriage with one afflicted with sexual
anomalies, e.g., a homosexual, a nymphomaniac?
It would be an oversimplification to state
that such cases of abnormal sexuality cannot be handled as such in ecclesiastical tribunals -or to say that the only solution is to
seek a declaration of nullity under the caput
nullitatis (reason for the decree of nullity)
of impotency, insanity, or otherwise to seek
a dissolution of the marriage as ratum et
non consummatum. We shall try to establish
that the sexual anomalies (moral degeneracy, constitutional immorality, social degeneracy, homosexuality, nymphomania, etc.)
may be valid grounds for the nullity of
marriage.
We admit the serious difficulties involved
in this subject:
1. The difficulty and vagueness in defining the sexual pervert, the sexual psycho-

path, the moral degenerate, the compulsive
sexual offender, the violent sexual offender,
etc.
2. The difficulty in securing valid evidence to categorize such individuals.
3. The difficulty in establishing that such
a person is incapable of contracting marriage, a stable union of two persons of
different sex for the purpose of having
children.
4. The difficulty of reconciling modern
psychology and psychiatry with the established jurisprudence of the Church.
5. The difficulty of defining the precise
caput nullitatis (reason for the decree of
nullity) of such cases.
6. The difficulty of establishing exact
juridical criteria for the declaration of
nullity.
The approach to the problem may be
from two sides: (1) based on the personal
incapacity of the person to enter a true
marriage - the approach of the modern
psychologists and psychiatrists; (2) based
on the defects of intellect and will which
prevent the person from giving true consent. The latter approach is the traditional
one followed in the jurisprudence of the
Rota.
I. Sexual Anomalies in General
This is the most difficult section to discuss in this paper, because of the number
of perversions or anomalies of sex and the
difficulty of determining what constitutes
the moral degenerate or one constitutionally immoral, or the sexual psychopath.
Dr. John R. Cavanagh, a noted Catholic
psychiatrist, clearly defines and describes
the types of sexual perversions which he
prefers to label as sexual anomalies.1 Among
'John R. Cavanagh, M.D., "Sexual Anomalies
and the Law," The Catholic Lawyer, IX (1963),
4-31.
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the anomalies listed by Cavanagh, the
following are pertinent: voyeurism, exhibitionism, transvestism, fetishism, sadism,
masochism, necrophilia, incest, rape, troilism
(trolism), prostitution, sodomy, bestiality,
pedophilia, nymphomania, and homosexuality.
Certainly one who is afflicted psychopathically with one of these anomalies
would be classified as a moral degenerate,
'r one constitutionally immoral, or a sexual
psychopath. "Psychiatrically, those sexual
offences which are significant are those which
follow a repetitive obsessional fantasy, lead
to compulsive acts of forced sexual assaults
either on adults or children. These may be
of a nature of an unresisted urge (irresistible
impulse) ... a surface symptom of a more
profound psychic disturbance." Cavanagh
defines sexual perversions (deviations or
psychosexual abnormalities) as being
methods of sex gratification, mainly or exclusively, without penile-vaginal intercourse." '2 Many of these anomalies become
abnormal only when they take an extreme,
fixed, or compulsive form. Concerning the
responsibility of the sexual offender, Cavanagh feels that in many cases sex offenders
should be considered responsible, because
the offense represents lack of control over
normal temptations and normal sexual desire.' He rejects the concept of the sexual
psychopath as a person normal in all areas
of conduct except the sexual, i.e., not insane
4
except sexually.
Obsession is "an overpowering, persist2 Cavanagh, art. cit., p. 7. "The sexual psychopath

is usually defined in terms of his inability to
control his own sexual acts or perversions."Frank T. Lindman and Donald M. McIntyre, Jr.,
The Mentally Disabled and the Law (University

of Chicago Press, 1961), p. 299.
3Ibid., p. 28.
4Cf. Lindman and McIntyre, op. cit., p. 318.
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ent, and irrational idea accompanied by feelings of tension and fear";5 compulsion is "an
overpowering, unreasonable urge to perform
certain actions and is associated with the
development of tension and anxiety if the
act is not performed." 6 In evaluating the
responsibility, these factors of repetitive, obsessional, compulsive, and forced actions
must be taken into consideration. The question of an irresistible impulse will arise. Each
case must be considered on its own merits:
"An unresisted urge is one which, because
of mental illness, so far causes the individual
to lose his power of choice in regard to particular acts that in spite of the fact that he
may reconcile an act as wrong, he feels so
impelled to act that he is unable to adhere
to what he considers right." 7 The sexual offender will in many cases be legally responsible. His responsibility will depend upon
his basic disorder, not his sexual offense,
and also depend on the degree of compulsiveness involved in the condition.8
The question here is whether a person
afflicted with a compulsive obsession to one
of the sexual anomalies (mentioned above)
can enter a valid marriage. Many persons
with such anomalies are rational, not insane,
and responsible. Unless a person has one of
the sexual anomalies as a symptom of a
much deeper mental disorder, we must consider this person as mentally capable and
responsible, able to understand and to will
to enter a valid marriage. Cavanagh points
out that a person should not be judged on
5 John R. Cavanagh, M.D., and John R. McGoldrick, M.D., FundamentalPsychiatry (Milwaukee:
Bruce, 1958), p. 264.
6 Ibid., p. 265.
7 Cavanagh, "A Psychiatrist Looks at the Durham
Decision," The Catholic University Law Review,
V (1955), 26.
8 Cavanagh, "Sexual Anomalies and the Law,"
The Catholic Lawyer, IX (1963), 30.
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the basis of symptoms. The responsibility can
be clarified by the statement that, psychiatrically, those offenses which are significant
are those which, following a repetitive obsessional fantasy, lead to compulsive acts
of sexual assault either on adults or children."
Put in philosophical terms: an unresisted
urge is one which has developed so excessively at the expense of the other psychic
powers that in comparison to this urge, the
other powers exert negligible influence upon
reason when it is called upon to make a
judgment. This urge occupies the focal point
of consciousness ... it becomes the basis
upon which the intellect represents an object
or some course of activity as desirable to the
will .... This occurs not as an isolated temporary mental illness, but as part of a continuing illness which both antedates and succeeds this particular act) 0
Following these definitions by a psychiatrist, we therefore can envision the possibility of a person who has been afflicted
with a sexual anomaly connected with repeated perverted acts which are the result
of an obsessional fantasy and which lead to
compulsive acts which are considered abnormal as being a person who is constitutionally immoral, or as a moral degenerate
in regard to sex.
Does such a one have a personal incapacity to marry? The law does not directly
answer the question. Moral or personal incapacity to marry, like insanity, is not mentioned among the diriment impediments of
Chapter IV (can. 1067-1080) of the marriage law in the Code of Canon Law, or
among the defects of consent of Chapter V
(can. 1081-1093). The Code does not legislate and there is no history of jurisprudence
for such an impediment or reason for nullity.
As in the case of insanity, the norms of the
9 Ibid., p. 29.
10 Loc. cit.

natural law must determine the validity of
marriage which is contracted by one who is
morally incapable of giving full marital consent.
Since there is no specific legislation for
such an impediment or defect of consent as
envisioned by one morally incapable of a
contract, ecclesiastical judges are presented
with a problem of adjudication, especially
since incapacity is not specified in the natural law. 1
The question often proposed to tribunals
is whether or not a person was able to give
valid consent. In the case of one who is considered morally incapable (e.g., for our
purposes, those afflicted with a compulsive,
irresistible obsession to a sexual anomaly),
the question more precisely is whether or
not the person fundamentally was unfit for
the state of matrimony.
The Rota has traditionally declared marriages invalid by the defect of consent based
on the psychic inability to give sufficient
consent at the time of the marriage. Because
of recent studies in psychiatry and psychology, new light has been brought to bear on
the capacity of persons to elicit human acts,
and the Rota has begun to speak of the case
' 1
in which "usus rationis non sufficit. 2
The law states that all may contract marriage who are not prohibited by law (can.
1035). Keating recently wrote an excellent
article concerning the psychically incom11Sacrae Romanae Rotae Decisiones: Dec.
XXXIII, dec. XLIV (1941), p. 489, n. 2, coram
Heard, 16 octobris 1942: "Matrimonium quod
spectat, nullum positive statuit Ecclesia impedimentum pro eis qui sanae mentis non sunt, sed
rem reliquit iuris naturae principiis." ("The Church
has not positively established any impediment
with regard to marriage for the insane, but has
rather left the matter to the principles of natural
law.")
12 S.R.R.
Dec. XXVI, dec. LXXXIII (1934),
p. 709.
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petent. 13 He states that the caput nullitatis
(reason for the decree of nullity) would be
grounded on a defect of personal capacity,
sanctioned by a lex inhabilitans (anomaly)
of the natural law. 1 4 The Code also requires
that the contractants must be iure habiles
(legally competent).15
The personal capacity or incapacity of the
person with a sexual anomaly is important
to consider here. Writing of the discretio
iudicii in ordine ad matrimonio (capacity
of understanding requisite for marriage),
D'Avack states that the legislator considered
it superfluous to sanction with a specific
norm the nullity of a bond contracted by
one who is found to lack sufficient capacity
to intend the act which he effects and the
life and duties which emanate from it.16 It
is an unquestionable presumption that the
intrinsic incapability of the contractant to
intend and to will the marriage renders the
bond ipso iure (by the law itself) null,
specifically because it places him in the impossibility of emitting a conscious and deliberate consent. But D'Avack finds it more
correct to consider the case as one of
personal incapacity-rather than lack of
consent. The defectus discretionis iudicii
(failure in the ability to understand) is precisely a defect of the natural capabilities of
the person, and only in its effect does it
resolve itself to a defectus consensus (defective agreement).
John R. Keating, "The Caput Nullitatis in
Insanity Cases," THE JURIsT, XXII (1962), 391 ss.
14 Ibid., p. 396.
15 Can. 1081: "Matrimonium facit partium consensus inter personas iure habiles legitime manifestatus..." ("Marriage is effected by the consent
of the parties lawfully expressed between persons
who are capable according to law ... ")
16 Petrus D'Avack, "Sul dejectus discretionis iudicii nel Diritto Matrimoniale canonico," Archivo
di Diritto Ecclesiastico, 11 (1940), 157-178.
13
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The Code does not speak specifically of
the defectus animi (defective intent) among
the diriment impediments (in which there is
also included the requirement of personal
capacity) or among the defects of consent,
but considers it as a lack of natural capacity.
The Code, however, does speak of the
discretio iudicii (discretion of judgment)
either as one of the fundamental prerequisites of a general personal capacity, when in
Book II it states: "Infanti assimilantur quotquot usu rationis sunt habitu destituti" ("All
persons who are habitually without the use
of reason are judicially in the same class as
infants"), (can. 88, § 3); or as one of the
juridical capacities of the procedural law
when in Book IV, canon 1648, states: "Pro
minoribus et iisqui rationis usu destituti
sunt, etc." ("In favor of children and those
persons who are bereft of reason.") Finally,
concerning penal responsibility and imputability, Book V, canon 2201, rules: "Delicti
sunt incapaces qui actu carent usu rationis."
("Persons who actually lack the use of
reason are incapable of crime.")
When the Code treats of matrimonial
consent and its defects, it always refers to
the contractants who are already iure habiles
ad contrahendum (legally fit for marriage),
i.e., contractants who are pleno usu praediti
sive cognitionis intellectivae sive deliberationis volitivae (endowed with either the full
use of intellectual cognition or volitive deliberation), and who are constitutionally and
juridically capable of giving valid matrimonial consent.
Just as in all other human acts, so in
matrimony there is required in the contractant "sufficiens discretio iudicii ad actum
intelligendum et eligendum." ("Having sufficient understanding to know and to elect to
perform an act.") The general dispositions
of the positive law are found in canon 1035:
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"Omnes possunt matrimonium contrahere,
qui iure non prohibenteur." ("All persons
who are not prohibited by law can contract
marriage.") Canon 1081 determines the
consent "inter personas iure habileslegitime
manifestatus." ("Lawfully expressed between persons who are capable according to
law.") These canons refer primarily to the
fundamental requirement of personal capacity of the contractants. It is the natural law
which inhibits the celebration of marriage by
one who would not have full and perfect
consciousness or free capacity of self-determination with relation to the bond which he
intends to bring into being and to the very
serious rights and duties inherent in the
bond, which he must assume. Sufficiens
discretio iudicii (Sufficient ability to understand) is indispensable in canonical marriage, considering its juridical nature - a
consent of the parties alone ("Qui nulla humana potestate suppleri valeat") .17("Which
[consent] no human power can supply").
Granted that the defect of the personal
capacity is intrinsically bound up with the
consent, still every alteration or every lack
of intellective knowledge or every defect in
the election and deliberation of the will resolves itself into a true defect of consent.
The defect of personal natural capacity is
referred to and is the consequence of the
manifestation of the consent of the parties. 8
Only the knowing and willing man can be
held accountable to his proper actions according to St. Thomas19 and the doctrine
17

Can. 1081, § 1.

isD'Avack, art. cit.
19 St. Thomas, Summa Theol., I-Ilae, q. 21, a 3:
(The "reference should read thus: St. Thomas,
Sunima Theol., I-Iae, q. 21, a. 2 (not 3).")
"Tunc actus imputatur agenti, quando est in potestate ipsius, ita quod habeat dominium sui actus."
("An action is imputed to an agent, when it is in
his power, so that he has dominion over it.")

and practice of the Rota.20 Also according
to St. Thomas, an act proceeds from the will
with knowledge of its end. 2 1 Consequently,
just as in the prudens electio voluntatis
(a judicious willed choice [to act]), so
without the consciousness of the act either
in itself or in its consequences, the latter is
no longer voluntary, because, as St. Thomas
explains, "nihil volitum nisi praecognitum"
("nothing is willed which is not first conceived"). Hence, every manifestation of
consent presupposes and demands a "iudicium quoddam de eo in quod consentitur"
("power to judge measured by that to which
consent is given") .22 Canonists and theologians agree that the act must be "positus
cum plena mentis advertentia et perfecto
voluntatis consensu" ("arranged with complete mental perception and perfect volitional accord").
Plena mentis advertentia (complete mental acumen) requires that the author have
not merely an instinctive perception or a
purely material understanding of an act (an
advertence proper in some extent to animals), but rather a true logical foresight and
full consequential knowledge of the act itself and its motives, in its essence, its importance, and its effects.
Perfectus voluntatis consensus (perfect
voluntary accord) requires that the author,

20

S.R.R. Dec. XXII, dec. XII (1930), p. 127:

"Actus autem humanus tunc tantum habetur, si
procedat ab homine qua tali seu ab eius deliberata
voluntate, idest si actio ponitur a sciente et
volente." ("A human act is had only if it proceeds
from man as such, from his deliberate will; that is,
if the action is posited by a knowing and willing
man.")
21 Summa Theol., I-Iae, q. 6, a. 1: "Actus proce-

dens a principio intrinseco seu a voluntate cum
cognitione finis." ("An act proceeding from an
intrinsic principle, that is, from the will with
knowledge of its end.")
22 St. Thomas, Summa Theol., I-IIae, q. 74, a. 7.
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having full consequential consciousness of
the act, freely determine himself to put it
into being, i.e., an act not merely the result
of automation, or from an external force,
but by his own actual intrinsic volitive deliberation. It is the rational appetite which
brings this about: "apprehenso fine, aliquis
potest, deliberans de fine et de his quae sunt
ad finem, moveri in finem vel non moveri"
("After a goal to be achieved has been determined, anyone who thinks about it and
considers those things attainable by reaching the goal, will be either moved toward its
23
attainment or not.")
It follows from scholastic teaching that
whatever is lacking in the contractual consent, i.e., if one were deprived of the plena
mentis advertentia, or the perfectus voluntatis consensus in ordine ad matrimonium
(complete mental perception or the complete volitional integrity proper for the married state), there would be lacking true
consent. The grave inversion of the sexual
anomalies, or the serious lack of personal
capacity, could affect both the intellect and
the will in the contract of marriage. The sex
anomalies can impede the action of the intellect and the will 2 4 especially in the sensi23 St. Thomas, Suma Theol., I-Iae, q. 6, ad 2.

The natural intrinsic capability to be responsible
or accountable juridically for an act is that which
the canonists and the theologians call the sufficiens
discretio idicii actui proportionata, i.e.,

two

elements distinct but concurrent and interdependent:
(1) Intellective-the capability to know the act
both in itself and its immediate and mediate consequences, in such a way as to consciously put it
into effect, i.e., true capability for logical and consequential understanding of the act, so as to be
able to discern and differentiate the motives, to
measure its religious, ethical, social, juridical
value, its mediate and immediate consequences.
(2)

Maturitas libertatis is volitive

capability

freely to self-determine oneself to the performance
or non-performance of the act.
, St. Thomas, Summa Theol., I-Ilae, q. 73, a. 6:

1964

2 5

tive appetite.

It is conceivable, therefore, that a person
with a sexual anomaly which has reached
the state of an obsessive, irresistible, compulsive urge would have a personal incapacity so that he would not be able to elicit a
free and deliberate act which is required in
matrimonial consent. It is possible for a man
to have a right understanding of marriage,
but because of some defect to be incapable
of right action of the will to elicit the act of
"Unde causae quae diminuunt iudicium rationis,
sicut ignorantia; vel quae diminuunt liberum
motum voluntatis, sicut infirmitas vel violentia aut
metus aut aliquid huiusmodi,diminuunt peccatum,
sicut et diminuunt voluntarium; in tantum quod si
actus sit omnino involuntarius non habet rationem
peccati." ("Wherefore those causes which weaken
the judgment of reason (e.g. ignorance), or which
weaken the free movement of the will (e.g. weakness, violence, fear, or the like), diminish the
gravity of sin, even as they diminish its voluntariness; and so much so, that if the act be
altogether involuntary, it is no longer sinful.")
25 St. Thomas, Sumnma Theol., I-I,
q. 77, a. 1:
"necesse est quod quando una potentia intenditur
in suo actu, altera in suo actu remittatur, vel
etiam totaliter in suo actu impediatur ...quando
motus appetitus sensitivi fortificatur secundum
quamcumque passionem, necesse est quod remittatur vel totaliter impediatur motus proprius
appetitus rationalis, qui est voluntas. Alio modo ex
parte obiecti voluntatis, quod est bonum ratione
apprehensum. Impeditur enim iudicium et apprehensio rationis propter vehementem et inordinatam apprehensionem imaginationis et iudicium
virtutis aestimativae, litpatet in amentibus." ("it
follows of necessity that, when one power is intent
in its act, another power becomes remiss, or is
even altogether impeded, in its act ...when the
movement of the sensitive appetite is enforced in
respect of any passion whatever, the proper movement of the rational appetite, or the will must, of
necessity, become remiss or altogether impeded.
Secondly, this may happen on the part of the
will's object, which is good apprehended by reason.
Because the judgment and apprehension of reason
is impeded on account of a vehement and
inordinate apprehension of the imagination and
judgment of the estimative power, as appears in
those who are out of their mind.")
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marriage.2
The attitude of the Rota concerning this
point can be illustrated by two cases. Both
treated of the personal incapacity of the
contractants.
1. The first case, coram Wynen (1941 ),27
26

St. Thomas, Summa Theol., I-Ilae, q. 77, a. 2:

"Ad recte agendum homo dirigatur duplici scientia, scilicet universali et particulari, utriusque

defectus sufficit ad hoc quod impediatur rectitudo
voluntatis et operis.... Et iterum considerandum
est quod nihil prohibet aliquid sciri in haitu, quoad
tamen actu non consideratur. Potest igitur contingere quod aliquis etiam rectam scientiam habeat
in singulari, et non solum in universali, sed tamen
in actu non consideret... quod autem homo non
consideret in particulari id quod habitualiter scit,

quandoque quidem contingit ex solo defectu intentionis; ... quandoque autem homo non considerat
id quod habet in habitu, propter aliquod impedimentum superveniens .... vel propter aliquam

infirmitatem corporalem; et hoc modo ille qui est
in passione constitutus, non considerat in particulari id quod scit in universali, inquantum passio
impedit talem considerationem. Impedit autem
tripliciter: ... tertio per quamdam immutationem
corporalem, ex qua ratio quodammodo ligatur, ne
libere in actum exeat." ("Since man is directed to
right action by a twofold knowledge, viz., universal
and particular, a defect in either of them suffices
to hinder the rectitude of the will and of the
deed.... Again, it must be observed that nothing
prevents a thing which is known habitually from
not being considered actually: so that it is possible
for a man to have correct knowledge not only in
general but also in particular, and yet not to consider his knowledge actually. ... Now, that a man
sometimes fails to consider in particular what he
knows habitually, may happen through mere lack
of attention;... Sometimes man fails to consider
actually what he knows habitually, on account of
some hindrance supervening ....

or some bodily

infirmity; and, in this way, a man who is in a
state of passion, fails to consider in particular what
he knows in general, in so far as the passions
hinder him from considering it. Now it hinders
him in three ways ... thirdly, by way of bodily
transmutation, the result of which is that the
reason is somehow fettered so as not to exercise
its act freely.")
27S.R.R. Dec. XXXIII, dec. XV (1941), pp.
144 ff. It received a favorable decision in 1933,
negative in 1935 - ex capite defectus consensus ex

is that of a man addicted to narcotics and
guilty of further criminal acts, etc. It deals
with the constitutional immorality of the
man. Some observations of the Rota concerning this case are worthy of note.
The Rota appraises the concept of the
new opinions of the psychologists and the
psychiatrists, who require not only the use
of reason and the formal act of the will, but
a "third element," appreciation (seu aestimationem) of the object, which would contain an element both cognoscitive and
appetitive as a function of the reason and
the will. The Rota mentions that this theory
is neglected in moral theology and canon
law. The theory is that the cognoscitive
function has two elements: one, representative or conceptual; the other, ponderative or
estimative - and that these are concerned
with the agibilia or the practical judgment.
The cognoscitive concerns the object (quid
sit), the estimative cognition considers the
social, ethical, juridical value of the object
(e.g., marriage). The Rota states that this
actually refers to the object from two different aspects. According to the modern
psychologists, the act can be impugned by
reason of the defect of the required appre28
ciation.

If a man cannot estimate even substantially the thing to be done, he is impeded in
his natural appetitive faculty, either from an
impediment which is only transitory (e.g.,
drunkenness, delirium, violent fever) or
from a habitual defect as found in many
mental cases, and psychic anomalies, which
are recently called "constitutional immorality."29
parte viri. (It received a favorable decision in
1933, negative in 1935 - by reason of a defect of
consent on the part of the man.)
28 Ibid., no. 9, p. 151. Concerning this same subject
cf. also Dec. XXXV, dec. LVII (1943), pp.
596-600.
29 Loc. cit.
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Modern psychologists demand, besides
the intellectual conception and consequent
act of the will, a "third element" to elicit
valid matrimonial consent; and they assert
that the man in this case, because of his constitutional immorality or by a defect of the
ethical element, could not know the value
and weight (momentumn) of marriage and,
therefore, did not elicit valid marriage consent. The Rota explains that this is more
accurately a description of the foreknowledge by which the act of the will is constituted and can be called human - really the
praecognitum (premeditation).
The Rota admits that, notwithstanding
the new terminology, the theory substantially agrees with the scholastic philosophy.
According to St. Thomas and ecclesiastical
jurisprudence, the mere use of reason or the
previous knowledge of the nature of marriage as described in canon 1082 is in no
way sufficient, but there is also required a
discretio (capacity to discern) and a naturitas iudicii (mature understanding) which
is properly proportioned to enter the marriage contract.30 It is much more important
in the contracting of marriage, which imposes a grave and perpetual obligation.
It is to be noted that constitutional immorality must be understood in the psychological sense, namely as the psychological
incapacity of a person rightly to consider
the ethical value and, according to this right
estimation, to direct his mode of acting. It
is not to be taken in the theological sense,
as the conceptual incapacity to understand
a wrong or to elicit an act which is a sin.
Both senses are intimately connected, because it can be rightly asked whether one

can validity contract a theological fault
31
when he cannot estimate its ethical value.
The Rota continues: "It can no longer be
sustained that constitutional immorality is
nothing more than a species of mental illness." If these men are considered such that
crimes can be imputed to them, by what law
are they judged to give valid consent? We
reply that such men cannot sufficiently estimate the value and the weight of marriage
and all the obligations connected with it.
But how can we know that such a defect is
so grave that they cannot estimate the substantial value of marriage? (Tanzi, the psychiatrist, points out the great difficulty in
establishing the certain boundaries between
32
normal and abnormal.)
The Rota concludes that if there is sufficient estimative knowledge of the substantial
value of marriage, there is not, however,
required an exact reasoning or understanding of each and every obligation connected
with marriage. Much less is it required that
one have a firm propositum to fulfill the obligations of marriage, or is there needed a
reflex estimative knowledge. So little is required for valid consent in a man who has
sufficient conceptual knowledge of the nature of marriage (can. 1081, § 1) and is
33
endowed with free will.

0 St. Thomas, Dist. 27, q. 2, ad 2 ad II; S.R.R.,

what marriage is does not suffice, which knowledge can be had even in a youth; but moreover
there is required maturity of judgment proportioned to the matrimonial contract to be entered

dec. cit., n. 11.
31 S.R.R., dec. cit., n. 15.
32 Ibid., n. 16.

3

Ibid., n. 28: "Ad valide contrahendum non
sufficit mera cognitio quid sit matrimonium, quae
cognitio etiam in puero haberi potest, sed insuper
requiritur maturitas iudicii, quae contractui matrimoniali ineundo proportionata sit... sicuti alicui
peccatori habituali nequit ideo, quia habitualiter
pravos actus committit, abiudicari liberum arbitrium, ita ei adiudicari nequit facultas cognoscendi
valorem substantialem rei agendae, esti agatur de
re magni ponderis qualis est matrimonium." ("In
order to contract validly, mere knowledge of
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The Rota further warns that we must be
careful in using this modern doctrine in
judging the nullity of marriage because of a

defect which lacks even an appropriate
name (ambiguous terms: constitutional immorality, moral insanity) and about whose
essence even the authors are divided. Extreme caution must be used in adjudicating
nullity because of the uncertainty of juridical criteria and such equivocal terms which
may cause confusion.

34

2. The second case of the Rota pertinent
to this subject is one of nymphomania,
coram Heard (1942).3.5 The Rota considers

in this case the fact that the intellect may
remain intact, but because of a defect of the
equilibrium of the organs and the co-ordination of the powers, the will is rendered inefficacious, and there is had either abulia or
inertia, or an irresistibleimpulse which the
person cannot resist.3 6
into ... just as it cannot be denied that an habitual
sinner possesses free will, because he habitually
commits depraved acts, so also it cannot be denied that he possesses the faculty of knowing the
substantial value of the matter to be done, although there is question of a matter of great
importance, such as marriage.")
Ibid., n. 13 and 14. The Rota gave a negative
decision to this case, not because of the personal
incapacity, but because of the lack of evidence,
and because three years before the marriage the
man had apparently been cured of his narcotic
addiction.
35S.R.R. Dec. XXXIII, dec. XLIV (1941), pp.
488 ss.
U St. Thomas, Suppl., q. LI, art. I: "Quidquid
impedit causam de sui natura impedit et effectum
similiter .... Consensus autem volintatis est actus,
qui praesupponit actum intellectus." S.R.R., dec.
cit., p. 489: "Intellectus autem et volUntas sunt
facultates animae ideoque penitus spirituales...
nec ulli morbo physico subiacere possunt ....
Extrinsice tamen, seu in suo operatione, impediri
possunt ob defectus sive in sensibus externis et
internis, quibus utitur intellectus ad conceptuts
formandos et deinde iudicium, sive in potentiis
executivis, quae imperio voluntatis subserviunt ...

Those who lack the use of reason are to
be prevented from marriage and not only
those who lack use of reason, such as idiots,
but also those who are like them in some
way, who cannot form a right judgment of
the nature of the contract, such as infants,
or those equal to infants. Supposing sufficient knowledge in the agent, there is also
required for consent sufficient deliberation
of the will, which clearly is lacking where
the intellect is absent, and also when disturbances either of the intellect or will, through
abnormal phantasies or disordered nerves,
remove the possibility of making a true election of the will. A person, therefore, can be
such that, although master of himself, he
commits acts which he reproves, because he
is dominated by an interior invincible force.
The intellect remains sufficiently sane, and
3
the delirium exists only in the acts. 7
It is not necessary for a valid contract that
the person have before his eyes the sanctity
of matrimony (can. 1082). The case of the
nymphomaniac, rather than arising from a
defect of the necessary knowledge, is in fact
based on the personal incapacity of the
woman to give valid consent on account of
sic digestio impedit contemplationem, haec vero
digestionem retaardat, tristitia generat morbum,
laesio organorum amentiam causat." ("Whatever
impedes a cause, by its very nature likewise impedes the effect .... Consent of the will is an act,
which presupposes an act of the intellect." S.R.R.,
dec. cit., p. 489: "The intellect and the will are
faculties of the soul and are therefore completely
spiritual ... nor can they undergo physical sickness .... Extrinsically, however, in their operation,
they can be impeded because of defects either in
the external and internal senses, which the intellect
uses to form concepts and finally the judgment,
or in the executive powers, which obey the command of the will .... Thus digestion impedes contemplation, this latter hinders digestion, sadness
gives rise to sickness, organic injury causes insanity.")
37 S.R.R., dec. cit., n. 2, p. 489.

10
the impossibility of deliberation. The sexual
instinct completely dominates her personality - a sexual degeneration which renders
her pathologically irresponsible. She is not
amens (foolish) but demens (insane), a
monomaniac concerning libidinous acts. We
are concerned here not about her simulated
consent but rather that she gave consent
impulsed by a force of an irresistible instinct. The force of the irresistible instinct
cannot effect the election of the means even
indirectly. Neither is the degree of deliberation required for marriage to be exaggerated
- "sufficit quae ad peccatum mortale requiritur" ("all that is required is that degree
35
of intent necessary for mortal sin.")
If the consent of the woman does not
directly make the marriage invalid by reason
of the irresistible instinct, indirectly it makes
the marriage invalid - "ex ipsa intrinseca
et necessaria incapacitate contrahentis"
("from the very internal and compulsive incapacity to perform the marital act") to
preserve the bonum fidei.
The Rota compares this defect to the
diriment impediment of impotence. Impotence is not a diriment impediment to marriage unless it is incurable. If one is curably
impotent, he is master of his body and can
transfer the ius (right) to his body, not at
once but in the future exercise, which is
sufficient for valid consent. If the woman
was truly suffering an invincible sexual instinct so that she would indiscriminately
give herself to any man, at the time of the
marriage she was not master of her body
and thus could not transfer the ius to her
body. And it is not necessary to consider
39
whether it can be cured.
3 Ibid., n. 6.
39 ibid., p. 495. It is to be noted that the Rota
rendered a non constare decision because there
was not sufficient evidence for the invincible
instinct.
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As is evident from the two cases which
have been quoted from the Rota decisions,
such cases of one who is afflicted with a
sexual anomaly or one who is constitutionally immoral are not impossible, notwithstanding the warnings given by the Rota
about the difficulties inherent in such cases,
particularly because of the lack of specific
juridical criteria.
In adjudicating such cases, therefore, it
would be necessary to evaluate the circumstances of each case, to seek the counsel
of experienced psychologists and psychiatrists (peritti) (experts), and to weigh
carefully the influence of the obsessive compulsion on the action of the intellect and the
will. The Rota itself has taken into consideration (e.g., in the case of the nymphomaniac) the personal incapacity of the
subject to contract valid marriage, not only
by reason of the invincible instinct, but also
by reason of the intrinsic and necessary incapacity to contract marriage and to preserve the bona matrimoni (integrity of
marriage). Here there is no question of a
diriment impediment, there is no question
of insanity; but there is a basic incapacity
of the subject to give full and free consent
to the substance of the contract of marriage.
Is it not conceivable, therefore, that one
who is afflicted with one of the sexual anomalies, by reason of an obsessive compulsion to perform unnatural and perverted
acts, could also be considered in the same
category as the nymphomaniac, who has an
invincible sexual instinct contrary to the
substance of marriage?
II. Nymphomania and Homosexuality
We come now to a study of two specific
anomalies, homosexuality and nymphomania. We treat these because of the frequency
of such cases brought before ecclesiastical
tribunals in recent years.
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A. Nymphomania
Nymphomania is an excessive sexual desire in the female, usually psychogenic in
origin, which often leads to extramarital
relations or masturbation, and finally to
40
chronic compulsive promiscuity.
Besides the Rotal case of nymphomania
mentioned previously, there is another case,
coram Sabattini (1957) .1 In this latter case
the court declared that the mental defect of
the true nymphomaniac is not so much a
case of inability to elicit integral consent;
rather it has the juridical figure of a diriment
impediment and is quite similar to the
2
impediment of impotence.1
This case, like the one in 1942 coram
Heard, deals with the personal incapacity of
the subject to assume the obligation of
marital fidelity. It frequently happens that
the nymphomaniac, unless she sees marriage
only as a means of satisfying her stimulus
which is irresistible - in which case she
would necessarily lack liberty - quoad
matrimonium in fieri (as far as the marriage
ceremony) can posit the element of cognition and of the will necessary for the
contract, because she can understand the
substance of marriage and the bonum of
fidelity. The difficulty arises quoad matrimonium in facto (as far as an existing marriage) - or rather circa usum conjugii (with
respect to marital practice).
In comparing this anomaly with impotence, we know that impotence is an impediment, a juridical concept, not a psychological
species. Impotence is no more than that the
usus corporis (corporal connection) between spouses cannot be had. However, the
Cavanagh, "Sexual Anomalies and the Law,"
The Catholic Lawyer, IX (1963), 13. This subject
has already been treated by Keating, art. cit.
41 Fasc. n. 132. Reported in part in IlDiritto
Ecclesiastico,LXXI (1960), 314-322.
42 Keating, "The Caput Nullitatis in Insanity
Cases," THE JURIST, XXII (1962), 399.

nymphomaniac cannot have the usus exclusivus corporis (exclusive exercise of her
body) - a quality which is always necessary
to the usus matrimonialis (marital experience). And this, because of the degree of
her anomaly, gives her a personal incapacity. In this case (coram Sabattani-1957),
it is decreed that grave and incurable
nymphomania certainly invalidates marriage; the invalidating force does not come
from a defect of consent, but rather as a
diriment impediment, since the anomaly of
the nymphomaniac seems to approach the
diriment impediment of impotence.
The comparison of the two cases (1942
and 1957) reveals a slightly different approach. The first case (1942-coram
Heard) deals with marriage in fieri-and
considers the subject as giving consent, but
forced by an invincible sexual instinct, the
sexual degeneration which renders her pathologically irresponsible. The second case
(1957-coram Sabattani) approaches the
nullity after the manner of a diriment impediment and considers the marriage in
facto. The marriage is rendered invalid indirectly, based on the woman's intrinsic and
necessary personal incapacity to preserve
the bonum fidei. Because of her psychological defect (nymphomania) she is like a
person who is impotent. She is, therefore,
impeded and not able to give in marriage
the usus exclusivus corporis.
Regardless of the manner of approach to
these two cases, it is apparent that it is
possible to declare null and void a marriage
which is contracted by one who is afflicted
43
with a serious sexual anomaly.

40

43St. Thomas, Suppl., q. LI, art. 1. "The mind and
the will can be impeded in their operation by
reason of an extrinsic cause, either in the senses
by which the intellect forms its concepts, or in
the executive powers which are subservient to the
rule of the will."
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B. Homosexuality
Perhaps the most vexing problem brought
before ecclesiastical tribunals in recent
years has been the problem of homosexuality-in relation to the nullity of marriage.
Coburn has already treated this subject in a
paper read at the regional meeting of the
Canon Law Society of America in New
York City."'
In homosexuality there is a deviation of
the sex feelings away from their proper
heterosexual object to a sexual object of the
same sex. Dr. Cavanagh defines honosexuality as "a state in which the sexual object
is a person of the same sex, and in which
there is a concomitant aversion or abhorrence to the sexual relations with members
''5
of the opposite sex. 4
Homosexuals are also called perverts. But
this is not a truly defined description. There

44

Vincent Coburn, "Homosexuality and the In-

validation of Marriage," THE

JURIST,

XX (1960),

441-459.
St. Thomas uses the term sodomy in referring to
homosexuality, Snumna Theol., 1l-l1, q. 154, art.
12: Whenever there occurs a special kind of deformity whereby the venereal act is rendered unbecoming, there is a determinate species of lust.
This may occur in two ways: First, through being
contrary to right reason, and this is common to
all lustful vices; secondly, bezause, in addition, it
is contrary to the natural order of the venereal
act as becoming to the human race: and this is
called the unnatural vice. This may happen in
several ways. First, by procuring pollution, without any copulation, for the sake of venereal pleasLire. This pertains to the sin of uncleanness which
some call effeminacy. Secondly, by copulation
with a thing of undue species, and this is called
bestiality. Thirdly, by copulation with any undue
sex, male with male, or female with female, as
the Apostle states: and this is called the vice of
sodomy. Fourthly, by not observing the natural
manner of copulation, either as to undue means,
or as to the other monstrous and bestial manners
of copulation.
'5 Cavanagh, art. cit., p. 24.
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is a clear distinction.45 A homosexual may
be a pervert but he is not necessarily so. A
pervert is an individual, homosexual or heterosexual, who finds complete sexual satisfaction in a manner which frustrates the
primary purpose of the sexual act. A homosexual, or invert, therefore, is not a pervert
unless he performs perverse acts. The sexual
inversion is a way of thinking and feeling,
not merely a way of acting. The performance of homosexual acts is not in itself evidence of inversion. "Homosexuality ...is
not an entity in itself but is merely a symptorn of some underlying disorder, probably
neurosis.... A definition in terms of be-havior is preferable since homosexuality is a
symptom of underlying personality distortion and not of a single integrated psychi47
atric syndrome. '
It is important, therefore, to make a clear
distinction between the state of being a
homosexual and the way of acting as a
homosexual. There are some homosexuals
who are inverts as a way of thinking and
feeling, but who have never indulged in
overt homosexual acts.'5
Following the definition of Cavanagh we
have a restricted concept of homosexuality
-if; Loc. cit.
47 Leon Salzman, M.D., "The Concept of Latent
Homosexuality," The American Journal of Psychoanalysis, XVII (1957), 167.
4 John F. Oliven, M.D., Sexual Hygiene and
Pathology: A Manual for the Physician (Philadelphia, 1955), p. 430: "This is a chronic usually
lifelong disorder of the total personality, although
in a number of cases its only apparent manifestation is the abnormal direction of the sex drive.
Homosexuality is basically a medical (probably
chiefly psychiatric) problem. But because of its
relative incurability, the fairly frequent tendency
of these patients to seduce others, and because of
the almost instinctive animosity the homosexual
inspires in many normal people, in practice it has
remained more a social than a strictly medical
problem."
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(for our purposes). It will not be necessary
to evaluate the moral responsibility of the
homosexual or the theories as to the cause
of the anomaly (organogenic or psychogenic). We note, however, that there is no
agreement among psychiatrists that homosexuality is inborn.-"
Various divisions are given for homosexuality.1°
We shall follow Oesterle who divides
homosexuality into primary and secondary
homosexuality: primary is always founded
in the character of the person, possibly
innate, of indigenous causes; secondary is
found when the person acquires the anomaly
during life, often by seduction. There is a
further division between facultative and
obligatory homosexuality: facultative refers
to the bisexual attraction; obligatory is such
that in relation to persons of the opposite
49 James 1H.Van der Veldt and Robert P. Odenwald, Psychiatry and Catholicism (New York,
19 52 ),p. 380.
'0 Cavanagh divides the homosexual into three
types:
I. True homosexuality - also called psycho-sexual
homosexuality- is the condition described above.
The homosexual has no interest in the persons of
the opposite sex. This condition is usually considered to be acquired in early life and to be
psychogenic in nature.
2. Pseudo homosexuality- or erroneously called
bisexuality-a condition in which the individual
is sexually interested in both sexes. Not true
homosexuality.
3. Constitutionalhomnosexuality -a term used by
those who felt that the condition is inborn and,
therefore, unchangeable. "There is no scientific
proof of this theory." (Art. cit., p. 25.)
True or genuine homosexuality is also divided into
essential and acquired:
Essential, which is genetically determined or
caused by very early environmental factors or
influences, sometimes beyond consciousness.
Acquired, that is, predominantly determined by
new factors arising in later life-late childhood,
adolescence, or manhood. Cf. Michael J. Buckley,
Morality and the Homosexual (Westminster, Md.,
1959), pp. 16-17.

sex the person is absolutely impotent."
If we follow the definition of Oesterle
regarding the obligatory homosexual, and
if proof can be had that the person never
had any inclination toward the other sex,
the nullity of the marriage because of impotence might be relatively easy to establish.
When we consider the facultative or the bisexual homosexual, the marriage can be
consummated and thus it becomes indissoluble. In the latter case, according to present
jurisprudence and legislation, there can be
only the solution of the problem by a separation a mensa et toro (from bed and
board). The homosexual can, in many instances, consummate the marriage by normeal sexual intercourse, at least with great
psychic effort, sometimes with repugnance
and abhorrence, sometimes with the representation in fantasy that husband or wife is
the homosexual partner.
Homosexuality always presents a danger
to marriage, and often leads to the complete
breakup of the union; the marriage itself
becomes victimized. Precisely because the
homosexual is not always a priori prevented
from the consummation of the marriage by
reason of the aversion to the other sex, still,
as frequently happens, there is danger that
the marriage will not be consummated.
The canonist may ask the question: Can the
nullity of a marriage be explained on the
basis of homosexuality? The question is
pertinent because not every homosexual
man or woman is impotent.
One must determine whether the case is
one of obligatory or facultative homosexuality. If the homosexuality is so fixed that it
becomes obligatory, or if it is obligatory
from childhood, and if this has progressed
51 Gerard Oesterle, "De Relatione Homosexualitatis ad Matrimonium," Revista Espafiola de
Derecho Canonico, X (1955), no. 28, p. 23.
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in successive degrees, and this can be
established, then we are confronted with a
practical case of impotence absoluta et
insanabilis (absolute and incurable) .2
What makes the judgment of homosexuality so difficult is the fact that some of those
persons who are active homosexuals are
only facultative homosexuals, i.e., they are
bisexual. In such cases a judge cannot be
careful enough in giving a judgment or opinion, before accepting as proved with moral
certitude that impotence is present in the
canonical sense. It happens, and with
tragedy to the spouse, that a homosexual
desires marriage only as a coverup for his
perverse activity.
The Rota on February 16, 1940, in an
interesting case of functional impotence
with regard to a man who had the sexual
anomaly of practicing sodomy,5 3 gave some
practical directives for examining such
cases, with these observations: It is the
opinion of certain people that such inversion
is nothing more than the effect of an innate
instinct or a physical impulse, i.e., a sickness,
which is unconquerable and, therefore, perpetual. In foro externo (in the open forum)
it is necessary that we abstain from all kinds
of general judgments with regard to impotence which embraces perversion or inversion of the sexual appetite. Each case should
be carefully weighed. Even if there is aversion or frigidity towards the other sex, it
does not necessarily follow that it brings
with it or causes full and perpetual incapacity of performing copulation or of bearing
children.

52Oesterle, "Welchen Einfluss hat die Homosexualitiit auf die Ehen," OesterreichischesArchiv fir
Kirchenrecht, XII (1961), 325.

53S.R.R. Dec. XXXII (1940), dec. XV, pp. 141154.
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The Rota suggests questions which
should be asked in such cases: whether the
person in question suffered a sickness or a
pathological condition, either congenital or
acquired; at what age the vice was begun,
and from what cause, e.g., from morbid
dispositions, from defect of discipline of
parents, from a seducer, or from excesses in
adolescence. The jurisprudence of the Rota
at that time held the opinion that perpetual
functional impotence cannot be readily said
to exist if it has had its source from these
previous vices.
It may be important for our study to
evaluate the argumentation of Father
Oesterle. Oesterle has written extensively
regarding homosexuality and the invalidity
of marriage. 4 The writer, after serious research of Rotal jurisprudence as far back as
1877, was unable to find any marriage case
which was based on the juridical cause of
homosexuality.,"
Oesterle argues that a marriage with a
homosexual can be annulled on three
grounds: (1) exclusio matrimonii ipsius
54 "Animadversiones in Sententiam S.R.R., die 23

feb., 195 1, coram Staffa," 11 Diritto Ecclesiastico,
LXII (1951), 730-750; "De Relatione Homosexualitatis ad Matrimonium" cited in note 51 supra;
"Voluntas se obligandi et voluntas non adimplendi
ad tempus vel in perpetuum in ordine ad prolis
generationem," Perfice Munus, XXXIV (1960),
45; "Von der psychischen Impotenz," Ephemerides luris Canonici (1955); "Welchen Einfluss hat
die Homosexualitit auf die Ehen," Oesterreichisches Archiv fir Kirchenrecht, XII (1961), 305337.
35 Cf. Causa Jurinen. seu Viennen. before S. C.
Council - 28 iulii 1877; 15 dec. 1877; 23 martii
1878 (Thesaurus S.C.C., Vol. 136, pp. 406-409;
p. 601; Vol. 137, pp. 124-131); Causa Colonien.,
18 aug. 1906 (Thesaurus, Vol. 165, pp. 994-1009);
Causa Mechlinien., 17 feb. 1906 (Thesaurus, Vol.
165, pp. 476 ss.). The Congregation of the Council
always treated cases of impotence almost exclusively from the standpoint of the non-consummation of the marriage.
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(prevention of the marriage itself): there is
no intention of entering a real marriage;
(2) exclusio fidelitatis (infidelity); (3) exclusio iuris ad coniugalem actum (the prevention of the right to the marital act).' "
He attempts to prove the invalidity of marriage on homosexual grounds 7 by stating
that homosexuality is in its essence incompatible with marriage: Even though the
homosexuals may have the wish to break
off their prior relationships, they often are
unable to do so, because they lack the will
to make such a break, or they are unable
energetically to fight against their inclinations and, consequently, at the time of the
marriage they are lacking in good faith.
The arguments that homosexuality is incompatible with marriage may be summed
up as follows:
1. According to canons 1081 and 1086,
the homosexual could not have the will to
enter a true marriage; under the outward
appearance of marriage he desires to continue his homosexual relationships.
2. On the basis of canons 1081 and 1086,
the person before the marriage proposes to
sin against matrimonial fidelity, and this can
sometimes be established by evidence before
and after the marriage.
3. On the basis of canon 1081, matrimonial consent is not had in the sense that
the man and woman reciprocally hand over
and receive forever the exclusive right (ius
in corpus) (the right over the body).
For these reasons the marriage is invalid:
(1 ) because the homosexual is incapable, as
a result of the homosexual relation, even if
he had the intention of giving true matrimonial consent, of restraining himself from
the homosexual relationship (often there
results a true impossibility of normal inter56 Oesterle, "Welchen Einfluss ...
67 Ibid., p. 328.

" p. 305.

course with the spouse); (2) because the
homosexual not only does not permit the
exclusive right to marital intercourse, but
often excludes it entirely. The conclusion is
that homosexuality is incompatible with the
essence of marriage.
According to canon 1086, anyone who
externally manifests consent but inwardly
does not awaken the corresponding act of
the will simulates consent. The contract of
marriage requires four elements: (1) the
intention to conclude a true contract, (2)
the intention to bind oneself to the contract, (3) the physical and moral capacity to
bind oneself, and (4) the intention to fulfill
the duties that are undertaken.5 8 How far
is the homosexual physically and, at least,
morally able to bind himself to the marriage
contract? No one can enter a valid contract
who cannot dispose freely of the object of
the contract. It must be an object which is
possible both physically and morally. No
one is held to the impossible, nor is he able
to oblige himself to it.5 9 This doctrine holds
even if the object is only relatively impossible.
We have already treated of the case
of nymphomania (coram Heard-supra),
where this doctrine is strengthened by a
favorable decision. We feel that an argument can be drawn a pari (equally) for
homosexuals in the same classification as
the nymphomaniac. Homosexuals are irresistibly drawn to actions against their nature.
They are no longer masters of their own
actions in regard to a correct union as husband and wife. This is a sickness of the will.
A sick person can have full consciousness
58 Ibid., p. 329.
59 A. Vermeersch,

Theologiae Moralis, Vol. II
(Romae, Brugis, Parisiis, 1924), n. 411, p. 352; cf.
G. Heinzl, Sutmma Theologiae Moralis, Vol. I (ed.
30, Innsbruck, 1952), n. 63, p. 65; n. 70, pp. 70 ss.

10

of the situation. But he feels he is no longer
master of himself and is dominated by an
interior force, invincibly compelled to commit those acts which he reproves. The intellect remains sufficiently sane; the delirium
exists only in the actions.6 The homosexual
is incapable for the duration of his life to
bind himself to a natural use of marriage.
This thinking is certainly in accord with the
definitions of the modern psychologists of a
sexual anomaly, i.e., a sexual anomaly
which follows a repetitive obsessional fantasy, which leads to compulsive acts-an
unresisted urge.
To this we might add the fact that the
personal incapacity of the homosexual to
marry can be drawn not only from his lack
of intellectual and volitional activity' but
also from a direct inversion of nature, which
never, or only with great difficulty, can be
cured. Such a person cannct hand over the
right of his body to his partner, or receive it,
if the contract is for life and exclusive, with
ultimate reference to the procreation of
children.' -He is radically unfit for marriage;
he freely makes a contract which he cannot
fulfill.
We shall not consider the arguments of
Oesterle concerning the bonum prolis and
bonum fidei (for the good of the offspring
and for the good of the faith).6 3 He treats
at great length the dubium (uncertainty)
created by the Rota in some recent decisions,'!' whether or not there is the division
of the flesh by sexual acts contra naturam
66 Oesterle, art. cit., p. 332.
61 E.g., S.R.R. Dec. of 25 feb. 1941, Dec. XXXIII,

1943, S.R.R. Dec.
dec. XV (1941), p. 145; 16 iulii
XXXV, dec. LVII (1943), 596-600.
62 Oesterle, art. cit., p. 334.
G3 Cf. Oesterle, art. cit., pp. 326 ss.; "De Relatione
Homosexualitatis ad Matrimonium," Revista Espafiola de Derecho Canonico, X (1955), 41 ss.
64 S.R.R. Dec. XXVII, dec. XLII (1935), 358; and
coram Mattioli, n. 6141, Dec. 11, 1958.
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(against nature).
It has been considered as commonly held
that the constant canonical jurisprudence
concerning the bonum fidei is not vitiated by
acts contrary to nature, but only by acts per
se apti ad prolis generationem (which because of their very nature are appropriate
in begetting children). But the Rota has
also held the contrary opinion (according
to Oesterle):65
Communis sententia est adulterio aequipari
sodomiam, in ordine ad ius tributum parti
innocenti divertendi, a parte quae est in
culpa. Cuius sententia ea adducitur ratio
quod, etiam per sodorniam, coniux carnem

suan cum alio dividens perfecte frangat
fidem coniugii, quod eo tendit ut coniuges
fiant una caro. (The common opinion is
that sodomy is equal to adultery, relative to
the right given to the innocent party to
separate from the party who is at fault. The
reason given for this opinion is that even
through sodomy the spouse who shares his
flesh with another perfectly breaks the faith
of marriage, which strives to make the
spouses one flesh.)
Sodomy is therefore equal to adultery; the
Rota apparently has not always held the
same opinion./;
The arguments of Oesterle for invalidity
are not without merit, especially in the light
of modern psychiatry. The conclusion is
again that the personal incapacity of the
homosexual, like that of the nymphomaniac,
can create an inability to contract a valid
marriage. We may envision, therefore, cases
of homosexuals who in regard to matrimonium in fieri have a personal incapacity to
65S.R.R. Dec XXVII (1935) cora Massimi, 29
maii 1935, dec. XLII, p. 358, n. 3.
66 Oesterle lists many authors on both sides of the
argument. Those who held that sodomy or homosexuality does not create the division of the flesh
base their argument upon the opinion of St. Alphonsus. Oesterle even calls ino question the
source of this opinion, and the basis of the quotation. Cf. "De Relatione ... ," pp. 54 ss., esp. p. 58.
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contract a true marriage; and in the case of
inatrimonium in facto often have, in addition, a physical incapacity.
Conclusion
It must be admitted that this study of
sexual anomalies in relation to the nullity of
marriage does not solve these complex problems. However, cases of this nature have
been more readily accepted in tribunals in
recent years. A study of recent Rotal jurisprudence and of the commentaries of the
canonists reveals a growing perfection and
refinement as the research of modern psychiatry and psychology becomes surer and
more appreciated. Cases of persons with
these disorders should be investigated in
detail to determine the personal incapacity
of the subjects to enter a true marriage. If
found to be personally incapable, they
should be judged radically unfit for marriage.
Depending on the merits and the circumstances of the cases, the judges at present
may follow not only the traditional Rotal
treatment of such cases based upon defects
of intellect and will, but also the recent approach based upon the personal incapacity
of the subjects to make a contract which
they cannot fulfill.
Since the Code and the jurisprudence of
the Church for the past forty-five years have
not provided adequate tools to solve these
modern problems, we must look to other
sources. The advances in thought and systems of modern psychology and psychiatry
and the other related sciences should challenge us to reconsider cases from the aggregate total of our expert past experience
together with a judicious application of the
present research findings of these sciences.
It is obvious that further studies are necessary to assist the judges to: (1) examine

new thinking in psychology and psychiatry;
(2) define the homosexual, the sociopath,
the constitutionally immoral, etc.; (3)
study the concept of error and fraud related
to sexual anomalies and marriage; (4) define the concept of the constitutionally immoral, the sexual psychopath, etc., and their
inability to fulfill the obligations of marriage; (5) determine that heterosexuality is
a condition of valid marriage; and (6)
establish homosexuality and other sexual
anomalies as diriment impediments of marriage.uo
67 Recalls the words of Pope Pius Xl1- to the
Fourth International Convention of Catholic Doctors - in which he encourages the sciences of
physiology and psychology and the studies of the
mutual actions and reactions of physics and
morality, and in which he states that one may not
reject a teaching because it is new. - September 29,
1949: AAS, XLI (1949), 559 ss.; The Catholic
Mind, XLIII (1950), 250 ss.
Along these lines Father Joseph Goodwine has
made the following suggestions as revisions for
canons 1081 and 1083:
Canon 1081, § 3: Inhabiles ad validum consensum
praestandum, praeter quos expresse iure impeditos, stint:
n. 1. Qui carent usu rationis aut exercitio liberae
voluntatis;
n. 2. Qui tam deminuto vel tam immaturo usu
rationis inficiuntur, ut rectam aestimationem matrimonii eiusque iurium et onerum efformare nequeant;
n. 3. Qui immoralitati, perversioni sexuali, aut
pravis moribus tam addicti, ut nequeant onera ex
finibus proprietatibusque matrimonii profluentia
aut assumere aut adimplere.
Canon 1083, § 2: n. 2. Si persona iure habilis bona
fide contrahat cuM persona immoralitati, aUt perversioni sexuali, aut pravis moribus tam addicta ut
onera contractus fideliter adimplere nequeat.
(Canon 1081, §3: Besides those expressly impeded
by law, they are unqualified to give valid consent:
n. 1. who lack the use of reason or the exercise of

free will;
n. 2. who are afflicted by so diminished or so immature use of reason, that they cannot form a correct appreciation of marriage and of its rights and
duties;

10
It is hoped that the new codification of
law, now under consideration, will give
serious thought to problems of this nature.
It is suggested that the new revision might
establish a permanent or temporary impediment for such persons as those who have a
personal incapacity to marry - a temporary
impediment, for example, dependent upon
diagnosis and upon psychiatric therapy, before such a person would be allowed to
contract marriage.
On the other hand, it is hoped that the
new code of law will clearly define the
norms of actions, based on juridical concepts which will give the jurist a basis to
adjudicate the validity or invalidity of such
marriages, e.g., the circumstances before
and after the marriage which would prove

n. 3. who are so addicted to immorality, sexual
perversion, or depraved morals, that they cannot
either assume or fulfill the duties flowing from the
ends and properties of marriage.
Canon 1083, § 2, n. 2. If a legitimately qualified
person contracts in good faith with a person so
addicted to immorality, sexual perversion, or depraved morals that he cannot fulfill faithfully the
duties of the contract.)
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that the person not only should have been
prevented from entering marriage, but that
once the contract was made there would be
a basis in law and nature to declare such a
contract null and void.
These problems are beginning to represent a pressure and a challenge to us to examine and clarify what is essential in the
law. We must also search out what is dependent on the circumstances of our times.
With reverence we must preserve the law
and the principles of the law of the past. At
the same time, we must advance the cause
of jurisprudence in our day and for the
future, evaluating with prudence what is
new, treating with charity what seems an
innovation.
The task of jurisprudence and the work
of ecclesiastical tribunals are certainly in
accord with, and necessary in, the field of
pastoral work. Even the law must have a
pastoral outlook.
Canonical jurisprudence is a living science and it must not only hold sacred what
is the past, but also keep abreast of the
new dimensions of thought. We must face
the difficulties and the exigencies of our
times.

